[Date Prev][Date Next][Date Index]
Talk announcement: Tue March 19, 14:00 c.t., Dominik Peters (University of Oxford) "Truthful Aggregation of Budget Proposals"
- From: Martin Lackner <email@example.com>
- Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2019 10:17:08 +0100
- User-agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:60.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/60.5.1
We would like to invite you to a talk by Dominik Peters (University of
Title: Truthful Aggregation of Budget Proposals
Date: Tue March 19, 2019, 14:00 c.t.
Location: FAV 01 C (Seminarraum 188/2)
[1. Obergeschoß, access via "Stiege 4"]
We consider a participatory budgeting problem in which each voter
submits a proposal for how to divide a single divisible resource (such
as money or time) among several possible alternatives (such as public
projects or activities) and these proposals must be aggregated into a
single consensus division. Under 𝓁_1 preferences---for which a voter's
disutility is given by the 𝓁_1 distance between the consensus division
and the division he or she most prefers---the social welfare-maximizing
mechanism, which minimizes the average 𝓁_1 distance between the outcome
and each voter's proposal, is incentive compatible [Goel et al. 2016].
However, it fails to satisfy a natural fairness notion of
proportionality, placing too much weight on majority preferences.
Leveraging a connection between market prices and the generalized median
rules of Moulin , we introduce the independent markets mechanism,
which is both incentive compatible and proportional. We unify the social
welfare-maximizing mechanism and the independent markets mechanism by
defining a broad class of moving phantom mechanisms that includes both.
We show that every moving phantom mechanism is incentive compatible.
Finally, we characterize the social welfare-maximizing mechanism as the
unique Pareto-optimal mechanism in this class, suggesting an inherent
tradeoff between Pareto optimality and proportionality.
(joint work with Rupert Freeman, David Pennock, Jenn Wortman Vaughan)
With kind support of the Vienna Center for Logic and Algorithms (VCLA)
and the Wolfgang Pauli Institut (WPI).